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When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who de-
sign the model have an incentive to alter it in order infuence outcomes in a
fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of
the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of mea-
surement infrastructures such as national statisticall institutes, the extent to
which intellectual competition between di¤erent schools of thought may lead to
polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus
over other parameters, and 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1 Introduction
In the standard approach to political economy, agents di¤er in their preferences.
These preferences in turn are aggregated by some political mechanism, which
leads to public decisions being made. From such a perspective, an interest group
can inuence outcomes only by acquiring more weight in the political process,
for example through campaign contributions.
Yet another important element is the debate on the actual e¤ects of policies.
We observe that people di¤er in their beliefs about how policies relate to out-
comes, because there exists no rm, agreed upon theory that would pin down
those mechanisms. This in turn opens the door for interest groups to participate
in the debate so as to inuence beliefs in a self-serving fashion. It then follows
that, in addition to politicians, another class of people will naturally play a
key role in public decision making: the intellectuals. In particular, given that
arguably most decisions made by governments are economic in nature  from
aggregate demand management down to pricing of public utilities, allocating
health expenditure, or the cost-benet analysis of public works we expect a
prominent role to be ascribed to economists.
Controversies about how the economy works have important consequences
for which policies should be prescribed. And one may like such policies more
or less, not only because of ones beliefs about how they work, but also due to
ones preferences or self-interest.
For example, how much the government should be involved in macroeco-
nomic management depends on certain properties of the economy: Is there
slack, or are resources fully utilized? Are expectations adaptive or rational?
Are uctuations chiey driven by supply shocks or demand shocks? Is the
Keynesian multiplier high or low? The extent to which the economy will be
macro-managed by the government depends on the answers one gives to those
questions. That is, they depend on the theory, in a way tyically summarized in
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Table 1. Depending on ones tastes for government intervention, then, one may
favor one theory or another.1
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Consider another example: Should there be a minimum wage, and how high
should it be? Again, the answer depends on our views on the functioning of the
labor market. We are more likely to be in favor of high minimum wages if we
believe rms have monopsony power (and that is the main thrust of Card and
Kruegers (1994) new economics of the minimum wage), because then wages are
below the marginal product of labor and jobs wont be destroyed if they go up,
and if we think the elasticity of labor demand is low, because then minimum
wages entail a low cost in terms of foregone jobs. Furthermore, minimum wages
clearly have distributive consequences, so that some social groups will favor
them and others oppose them2 . Clearly, the former will benet if more people
hold views like those in the rst column of Table 2, because such views are likely
to lead to policy choices in favor of a high minimum wage.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Real world examples of views of the world being polarized along ideological
lines are common. We may mention the recent US controversy about the size
of the Keynesian multiplier, where more conservative economists aligned with
the former Republican administration argued that the multiplier was low, while
those aligned with the Democratic party considered it was high. Similarly, in
France the labor unions protested against the publication in the national statis-
tican institute journal of a study (Laroque and Salanié, 2000) which concluded
1Throughout this paper I will assume that agents have instrinsic tastes for the level of
government intervention. This could be interpreted as deeper beliefs regarding the nature
and e¢ cacy of government, but it can also be interpreted as a short cut for the welfare of
special interests, that is, people whose economic activity is more dependent on government
involvement in the economy will benet more from such involvement.
2At least this will be the case if no other, more e¢ cient scal instrument can be used for
the benet of the winners of such policies. See Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and Saint-Paul
(2000).
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that hundreds of thousands of jobs were lost because of the minimum wage,
while promoting alternative studies which did not reach such conclusions. Yet
we also observe, in addition to polarization, some degree of agreement, often
after a convergence process over time. We would like to explain why there is
more consensus on some aspects of the model than others, in light of our view
that beliefs are shaped by self-interest.
2 Inuencing outcomes through beliefs
I now turn to the question of how experts can inuence outcomes. A charis-
matic guru could in principle promote a view of the world which is demonstrably
false and yet wield inuence. But here we are talking about scientists and we
must impose discipline upon the set of theories that they may formulate. In
physics, all competing theories, including the correct one, must be observation-
ally equivalent, otherwise some would be rejected by the data. In economics,
things are more complex because beliefs a¤ect outcomes through the formation
of expectations by private agents and the design of government policies, which
is precisely the source of the intellectualspolitical power3 . In other words, the
data themselves depend on which model is believed by the agents. Nevertheless,
it makes sense to impose the restriction that any perceived model must match
those data. This means that the economy must be in a self-conrming equi-
librium (SCE, as in Fudenberg and Levine (1993,2007)) where beliefs may be
incorrect but are nevertheless conrmed in equilibrium. Only a deviation from
the equilibrium path would reveal that beliefs are wrong. In the context I am
dealing with here, to support such an SCE, the model must be autocoherent: If
everybody uses it to form their expectations, then it matches the corresponding
equilibrium probability distribution of the observables4 .
3MacKenzie (2008) documents the performative aspects of economic theory in the nancial
sector.
4See Saint-Paul (2012a) for an exploration of the properties of those models.
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This means that the model is observationally equivalent to the correct model
in the equilibrium where people use it. Figure 1 illustrates this concept. Suppose
that the model consists of two parameters, a and b: In general people may believe
that the values of those parameters are a^ and b^; which may di¤er from their
correct values. On gure 1, the correct model is represented by point CM while
point "1" represents an alternative, incorrect model. The locus IM(1) is the set
of "identied" models in the equilibrium where people use model 1 to form their
expectations. This locus contains more than one point, which means that the
model is under-indentied; of course the correct model CM explains the data
in any equilibrium, so it lies on IM(1)5 . As drawn, locus IM(1) goes through
1. This means that this equilibrium is self-conrming, i.e. that the model is
autocoherent. We can draw the locus of autocoherent models AC, i.e. the set of
models X such that X 2 IM(X). As long as AC is not reduced to CM, there
exist self-conrming equilbria supported by incorrect beliefs about the way the
economy works. Again that is possible because the model is under-identied.
Note that in that equilibrium, model 2 is also observationally equivalent to
model 1 (and to the correct model). Therefore, an economist could credibly
claim that it is correct. But if people were to believe him, they would act
di¤erently and the equilibrium would change. In that new equilibrium, the set
of identied models is now IM(2) instead of IM(1)6 . Since point 2 is not on
IM(2), model 2 is not autocoherent. It is self-defeating: the data would reject it
5Here we need to be more precise: what explains the data in any equilibrium such as
1 is the correct model of how the economy works conditional on expectations formation and
policy choices, supplemented with the correct description of expectations formation and policy
choices in that equilibrium, i.e. supplemented with the correct assumption that people use
the incorrect perceived model to make choices.
On the other hand, a model is autocoherent if the (incorrect) assumption that it describes
the behavior of the economy conditional on policies and expectations formation, along with
the assumption that it is used to form expectations and policies, explains the data, in an
equilibrium where it is indeed used to form expectations and policies  implying that the
second assumption is correct.
Implicitly, when one moves along the IM(1) locus, it is common knowledge that people use
the perceived model 1. Therefore, a point along that locus is a model which explains the data
in equilibrium 1, under the joint assumption that it is the correct one and that people use
model 1 to form expectations and policies.
6Since CM is the correct model, it explains the data in all equilibria. Therefore CM is on
the IM(2) locus as well.
5
if everybody believed it. An economist promoting model 2 remains scientically
credible only as long as people do not believe him. Finally, for the sake of
completeness, we may also consider the set of models that are economically
equivalent to model 1. That is the set of models that would deliver the same
equilibrium if people believed them. It is drawn as EE(1) on gure 1. Model 3
is on EE(1) and delivers the same equlibrium if people use it rather than model
1, but in that equilibrium, the set of models that describe the observables is
given by IM(1), and since model 3 does not lie on that locus it is again not
autocoherent7 .
The preceding literature has produced some important examples of such self-
conrming equilibria. Piketty (1995) studies a model of income inequality and
redistribution where people may believe either that "luck" is the key determi-
nant of income, or that "e¤ort" is the important variable. Any of those two
beliefs is self-conrming because of its policy consequences. In the "luck" equi-
librium, people vote for a high level of redistribution; e¤ort is then low and so
is the share of income inequality explained by e¤ort, which validates the belief
that luck matters more. The opposite holds in the other equilibrium8 .
Sargent (2008) studies a situation where the policy maker has some beliefs
regarding the (local) slope of the output/ination trade-o¤. These beliefs make
it optimal to select a given point on that trade-o¤, which is the equilibrium
point of the economy. As long as the economy remains at that point (and since
it is supposedly optimal, there is no reason to deviate from it), the slope of the
Phillips curve is unobserved. Consequently the initial beliefs about its slope are
7As discussed in Saint-Paul (2012b, 2012c), if people have to form expectations of observ-
able variables and the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is unique, instead of a model
people can just use the relevant moments to form their expectations and this is enough for
the economy to be at the REE. All autocoherent models are then economically equivalent to
the correct one and there is no scope for the expert to inuence outcomes.
This is a situation where the reduced form model is enough to form ones expectations.
Lucas and Sargent (1979) argue that in practice that is unlikely to be the case as far as
the policymaker is concerned. Hence the utmost importance of the identifying assumptions
underlying structural identication of the parameters.
8This mechanism has then been re-examined by Benabou and Ok (2001), Alesina and
Angeletos (2005).
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unchanged and the equilibrium is self-conrming.
What is missing from those examples is a positive theory of which perceived
model is actually used. My objective is to lay the steps for such a theory9 .
In the next section I will lay out a simple model of macro stabilization policy
that has been fully analyzed in Saint-Paul (2012b), and which delivers some
plausible predictions on how an economists ideological bias would inuence his
models. I will then extend it to study some aspects of the interplay between
political economy and the evolution of scientic paradigms. That is, in a world
of self-interested experts seeking to achieve inuence so as to make the world
more palatable to their tastes, how do we expect science to evolve? I will in
particular address the following questions:
 How do theory and measurement interact? How many resources will be
spent on measurement, and is this amount right? How will theory react
to the accuracy of measurement?
 What are the e¤ects of intellectual competition between several school of
thoughts? Do we expect polarization or consensus?
 How will experts try to preserve inuence when new data are inconsistent
with their model? How will the theory evolve in response to such events?
3 The self-interested expert: A simple macro-
economic example
I now briey discuss a variant of the model studied in Saint-Paul (2012b) which
is useful to illustrate the optimal choice of a perceived model by a self-interested
9For Marxists such as Lucaks and Gramsci, ideology necessarily reects the interests of the
"dominant class". Yet this ignores that this "dominant class" is heterogeneous. Exporters
and importers have conicting interests, and similarly for savers who hold nominal bonds and
fear ination vs. bankers who want credit to ow as free as possible.
Furthermore, in a democratic society, competition for devising the "dominant" ideology is
open. There is no presumption that the dominant ideology will be that of the dominant class,
unless we specify how the dominant class achieves intellectual domination. Clearly Hayek
(1949) believed that intellectual domination did not coincide with economic domination.
7
expert facing autocoherence constraints.
I consider an economy where the government attempts to stablize aggregate
demand shocks. As those are not directly observed, it needs to make inferences
and for this it will use a "perceived model". The perceived model is determined
by an expert who is fully believed by the government. In particular there is
no scope for the government to reverse engineer the statements of the expert,
contrary to the cheap talk literature (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). This is be-
cause the government knows neither the experts preferences and is incapable
of forming priors with respect to the correct model.
The governments objective is the following:
minE(y2 + 'g2);
where y is a measure of GDP and g a measure of government spending. The
greater the parameter '; the more reluctant the government is to use active
stabilization policy. It is therefore natural to interpret governments with a
higher value of ' as being more conservative.
The equilibrium of the economy is determined by the following two equations:
y = ag + u+ v; (1)
z = !u+ ":
The rst equation can be interpreted as an aggregate demand curve. The
variables u and v are two independent, normally distributed shocks with zero
means and variances 2u and 
2
v: I will label u a "demand shock" and v a "supply
shock". The parameter a is the response of output to government expenditures.
It is natural to call it the "Keynesian multiplier". The second equation de-
termines z; a signal that the government observes prior to setting the level of
expenditure g: This signal has noise "; which has a zero mean, is normally dis-
tributed, independent of u and v and has a variance equal 2": The parameter
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! describes how sensitive the signal is to the demand shock. The greater !; the
better the signal.
The preceding equations describe how the economy is objectively working.
That disturbances have a zero mean and are independent is common knowledge.
The correct model can be summarized as a quintuple (a; !; 2u; 
2
v; 
2
"): In what
follows I will normalize the correct values of ! and 2u to ! = 
2
u = 1:
Instead of the correct model, the government uses a perceived model which
has the same specication as the correct one but may have di¤erent parameter
values. For reasons that will be clear later, I will assume that the value of
2" is common knowledge. Therefore the perceived model can be described
as a quintuple (a^; !^; ^2u; ^
2
v; 
2
"); where, throughout the text, hats will denote
perceived values. Since the correct value of 2" is common knowledge, it appears
without a hat.
The perceived model is set by an economist who (i) knows the correct model
but chooses to report a potentially incorrect one, (ii) has preferences that may
di¤er from those of the government, and (iii) can only choose an autocoherent
model, otherwise the economy could not be in a SCE, as the model would be
invalidated by the data. Thus, as illustrated on gure 2 in the two dimensional
case, the economist picks his most preferred perceived set of parameters so as
to maximize his utility function subject to the autocoherence constraints. Here
I will assume that the economists objective is
minE(y2 + 'g2):
Therefore, the economist is more (resp. less) conservative than the govern-
ment if and only if ' > ' (resp. ' < ').
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
It is interesting to note that this same simple model could be given a totally
di¤erent interpretation and thus applied to a di¤erent kind of policy decision.
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For example we could interpret g as an indicator negatively related to the min-
imum wage (such as   lnw if w denotes the minimum wage), a as the absolute
value of the relevant elasticity of labor demand, and y as the level of unskilled
employment. In such a world, the greater '; the more the government prefers
stable wages over stable employment, which may be interpreted as being more
favorable to unions10 .
To solve this model, we need to derive optimal government policy, then we
need to compute the autocoherence constraints, and nally we need to solve for
the economists optimal perceived model.
3.1 Optimal government policy
It is easy to see11 that the optimal value of g is given by
g = z;
with
 =   a^!^^
2
u
(!^2^2u + 
2
")('+ a^
2)
: (2)
We observe that ; the degree of stabilization, only depends on the perceived,
rather than correct, parameters (with the exception of 2" which is common
knowledge). The absolute value of  is larger, i.e. there is more stabilization,
the less conservative the government (the smaller '), and the larger the per-
ceived Keynesian multiplier a^; as long as a^ <
p
':12 However for a^ >
p
' the
converse holds: beyond that threshold an "income e¤ect" dominates, by which
less activism is needed to achieve a given level of output stability.
10Under such an interpretation a greater value of ' now means that the government is
more "left-wing", under the traditional view that unions are left-wing.
11For details, see Saint-Paul (2012b). All the computations for the present pa-
per are in an Appendix available from the author or directly at http://saint-
paul.zxq.net/research/Schumpeter%20lecture%20appendix%20computations.pdf
12This can be checked by straightforward di¤erentiation of (2).
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3.2 Autocoherence
A consequence of the government pursuing the optimal policy is that g is col-
inear with z: Therefore, despite that the vector of observables (y; z; g) is three
dimensional, we can reduce it to a two-dimensional vector (y; z): This vector is
normally distributed with zero mean. Any autocoherent model must replicate
the distribution of the observables. This means that if people use this model
(under the assumption that it is common knowledge that everybody uses it)
in order to predict this distribution, the prediction is correct. Here this means
that we must match the variance-covariance matrix of (y; z); that is
E^y2 = Ey2;
E^zy = Ezy;
E^z2 = Ez2 = 1 + 2":
In those formulas, E^ denotes the mathematical expectation of a variable
computed using the perceived model, whereas E denotes the actual mathemat-
ical expectation in equilibrium, given that the economy is driven by the actual
parameter values while policy is driven by the perceived model.
There are three autocoherence constraints while the perceived model has
four free parameters. This leaves one degree of freedom to the economist to
choose the perceived model. Computations show that this can be reexpressed
as a trade-o¤ between a^ and !^ given by
!^ =
'+ a^a
'+ a^2
: (3)
3.3 The economists optimal perceived model
We now turn to the economists optimal perceived model. Here it is useful to
note that policy is reduced to one parameter, the degree of stabilization ; and
that the economist has one degree of freedom in choosing the perceived model.
This means that the economist can induce the value of  that he would pick
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if he were a dictator, that is, the one corresponding to the use of the correct
model and the preferences of the economist:
E =  
a
(1 + 2")('+ a
2)
: (4)
In the sequel, I will label such a situation as "quasi-dictatorship". Equating 
to E and using the autocoherence conditions allows us to compute the perceived
model. A central aspect is that it satises the following condition:
a^ = a
'
'
: (5)
That is, quite naturally, conservative economists tend to understate the value
of the Keynesian multiplier, so as to induce less stabilization. Left-wing econo-
mists do the reverse13 . Furthermore, the gap between the actual and perceived
Keynesian multipliers is equal to the preference gap between the economist and
the government. If the economist is aligned with the government (' = '), then
the correct model is revealed. Finally, we can also show that a more left-wing
economist will (i) understate the sensitivity of the signal to demand shocks !
(from (3)), (ii) overstate the variance of demand shocks 2u; and (iii) understate
the variance of supply shocks 2v:
14
Note that if policy were responsive to another driving variable in addition to
the demand signal z; then the vector of observables would be 6-dimensional. In
such a case the economist would not have enough degrees of freedom and would
be constrained to reveal the correct model. We will return to that later.
13Note though that this holds regardless of the value of a: It is also be true if a >
p
', i.e.
if the "income e¤ect" dominates. This is because in such a zone the autocoherence condition
implies a strong positive link between a^ and ^2u : that is, any empirically plausible model with
a higher Keynesian multiplier must also have a greater variance of demand shocks. The latter,
by itself, tends to induce a greater absolute value for : This is the channel through which
more left-wing economists induce more stabilization by claiming that a is large, even though
the e¤ect of a alone tends to discourage stabilization due to the dominant income e¤ect.
14See the computational appendix.
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4 From theory to measurement
In the preceding discussion, policy is driven by a theory. But policy can be
operational only if theory is supplemented by measurement. And, as measure-
ment is costly, one must decide how much resources to allocate to measurement,
that is, what to measure and how precisely to measure it. These choices will be
driven by theory: Theory will tell us which variables should be measured most
precisely because they matter most for policy.
For example, in a vivid account, Bos (2011) illustrates how the Keynesian
paradigm inuenced the design of national accounts:
The Keynesian type of analysis established a direct link between
economic theory and national accounting as both came to use the
same macro-economic identities. A direct e¤ect on national account-
ing was that another denition of national income and product be-
came most popular:(. . . ). Net national income at factor costs was
more and more replaced by gross national income at market prices.
The Keynesian type of analysis also threw a new light on the role
of the government.(. . . ) This induced the introduction of accounting
per sector, in particular the introduction of a government sector.
(. . . ) Keynes (. . . ) clearly saw the importance of national ac-
counting for planning a national economy in times of war as well of
peace.
 Bos (2011)
Clearly, di¤erent policy paradigms will lead to di¤erent measurement strate-
gies. For example, a "libertarian paradigm", based, say, on the ethical system
proposed by Nozick (1977), will not pay so much attention to aggregate variables
such as GDP or unemployment. Instead, it will attempt to track how well prop-
erty rights are enforced, and possibly to reconstruct the alllocation of resources
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that would prevail if property rights had been respected in the past, in order
to restore this allocation. As another example, recent proponents of paternal-
ist policies based on happiness economics, such as Easterlin (2001) or Layard
(2007) will insist on measuring happiness and the importance of behavioural
biases instead of, or in addition to, GDP. Indeed the UK government, follow-
ing those authors, is implementing a system for measuring happiness, which
will presumably trigger policy decisions that were not conceivable absent such
a system15 .
The preceding framework delivers some insights about the determnation of
macroeconomic theory whenever it is supplemented by public decisions about
measurement. In our simple example, we can assume that the government
can spend resources in order to better measure the demand shock. Let us
assume that one can pick the variance of the noise to the signal z; 2"; provided
one pays a cost16 c2=2": That is, the governments objective function is now
minE(y2+'g2)+c2=2"; while that of the economist is minE(y
2+'g2)+c2=2":
Hence, we now treat 2" as policy parameter set by the government prior to
the realization of the equilibrium (which is consistent to our prior assumption
that it is common knowledge). This means that if we denote by U ['; ; a^; 2"]
the utility of the government as a function of its preference parameter, its sta-
bilization policy, its beliefs, and its measurement policy, the latter will satisfy
the following rst-order condition:
@
@2"
U ['; ; a^; 2"] = 0:
We can check that this FOC is equivalent to
 
'+ a^2

2 =
c2
(2")
2 :
15See for example http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jul/25/wellbeing-
happiness-o¢ ce-national-statistics
16Given the Gaussian structure of the model, one would face an identical problem if, in the
fashion of Sims (2003), one faced a cost expressed in terms of the mutual information between
the signal z and the shock u:
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Using (2) and the autocoherence conditions we can re-express the optimal
measurement as a function of the perceived Keynesian multiplier only:
2"
1 + 2"
=
c('+ a^a)
a^
p
'+ a^2
: (6)
The RHS is increasing in ' : More conservative governments invest less
in measuring the demand shock because they are less keen on stabilizing the
economy17 . It is also decreasing in a^ : The greater the perceived Keynesian
multiplier, the more we want to stabilize and the more we want to measure the
demand shock18 . Also, from (2) we also know that  is larger in absolute value,
the smaller 2": This is fundamentally because the cross-partial
@2U
@@2"
is positive
and it is a quite general property of Bayeslaw: the lower the noise, the more
sensitive our inference is to the signal, and therefore the more we react to the
signal. As a result, there exists a measurement multiplier for any change in
the perceived model. For a given 2"; stabilization policy becomes more active
whenever the perceived Keynesian multiplier a^ goes up. But this also induces
greater e¤orts at measuring the demand shock, which leads the government to
stabilize even more.
In general the economist would like the government to pursue a di¤erent
level of measurement. The economistsoptimality condition for 2" is
2"
1 + 2"
=
c
p
'+ a2
a
: (7)
Suppose the economist is a conservative, i.e. ' > '. Then he would like
to spend less resources on measurement should the government use the correct
model. But, at the same time, the economist convinces the government to use
too small a Keynesian multiplier, which in itself leads to undermeasurement of
the demand shock. We therefore have two conicting e¤ects: The government
17This is true provided '=2 + a^(a^  a=2) > 0; which generally holds as long as a^ is not too
small or ' not too small.
18This is because  always increases with a^, even for a^ >
p
'; once one takes into account
all the autocoherence conditions.
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is more left-wing than the economist (the preference e¤ect), but has a more
right-wing view of the world than it really is (the belief e¤ect), precisely due to
the inuence of the economist.
Which e¤ect dominates? Suppose the economist sets the perceived model
optimally as above, taking the governments measurement policy, i.e. the value
of 2"; as given. This would be the case in a Nash equilibrium where the gov-
ernment sets  and 2" while the economists sets the perceived model simulta-
neously. Then again (5) will hold and substituting into (6) we now have
2"
1 + 2"
=
c(''2 + a2'')
a'
p
''2 + a2'2
:
The RHS can be shown to be larger than that of (7) for ' > '. This means
that at the perceived model derived in the preceding section, the government
will spend too few resources on measurement compared to what the economist
would do if he were a dictator. That is, the belief e¤ect dominates the preference
e¤ect. Consequently, if the economist takes this into account when setting the
perceived model, he will try to mitigate it by reporting a Keynesian multiplier
closer to the truth. This will occur, for example, in a Stackelberg equilibrium
where the economist rst selects the perceived model and the government then
determines the stabilization level  and the precision of the demand signal.
Therefore, that an underreported Keynesian multiplier generates a downward
bias in measurement will bring the perceived model closer to the correct one.
Note though that if instead the preference e¤ect dominated, then the opposite
would be true: The economist would be even more biased so as to reduce (if he
is conservative) the resources spent on measuring the demand shock, in addition
to inducing less stablization.
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5 Intellectual competition
The assumption that beliefs are set by a single, highly inuential intellectual is
obviously quite stark, although it may capture some specic historical period,
like the pre-1972 macroeconomic policy paradigm which was heavily inuenced
by Keynesian ideas, the import substitution model of economic development
which was popular in Latin America19 , or the case of highly ideological totalitar-
ian regimes such as the Soviet Union. In many other cases, though, economists
(and other social scientists) inevitably di¤er in their views. There are di¤er-
ent schools of thought with di¤erent followers, and these schools of thoughts
compete for scientic recognition and inuence over policies and outcomes.
We can use the above framework to analyze the role of competing theories.
In the same logic as above, I am going to assume that, in any equilibrium,
any theory which is believed by some people is capable of explaining the data.
This is a natural generalization of the autocoherence property. Again, that
several theories may explain the same data is possible because the model is
underindentied, and it implies that in any equilibrium, all theories are equally
good. In other words, competition for scientic recognition has eliminated all
the theories that do not explain the data. What remains is the attempt by each
school to inuence outcomes through the design of their theory. This inuence
comes from the fact that each theory is followed by a number of people, or
equivalently has a certain "weight", and these respective weights are reected
in the average belief of society, which we can approximmate as an average of
the di¤erent schoolsmodels. That is illustrated on Figure 3 in the case of two
schools, on which I will henceforth focus. There are two theories, represented
by points 1 and 2. Society believes in some average model A, which reects the
weight of each theory  as these weights vary, the average model lies on some
"contract curve" S. The greater the weight of theory 2, the closer A will be to
2 on S. Given that average belief, there is an average action which determines
19See Dosman, ed. (2006)
17
the equilibrium. In that equilibrium, the set of identied models is IM(A). Any
theory that survives must lie on IM(A). Note that the average model itself will
not generally be consistent with the data it is o¤ IM(A). The "average model"
is just a short-cut to represent how beliefs are aggregated between the di¤erent
schools; there is nobody who actually uses it and therefore it does not have to
explain the data.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
More specically, in the preceding example, each school i would have a
theory summarized by (ai; !i; 2ui; 
2
vi; 
2
"); and the equilibrium will be as if the
perceived model were a^ = a1a
1 
2 ; !^ = !

1!
1 
2 ; and so on. Again we can ask the
question: How will the di¤erent schoolsmodels depend on their preferences?
Instead of autocoherence constraints, each school must now design its model so
as to match the data in an equilibrium where people use the average model.
Then we can show that instead of the autocoherence trade-o¤ (3) school 1 faces
the constraint
!1   1 = !1a^(a  a1)
!^('+ a^2)
; (8)
and similarly for school 2.
5.1 Polarization
It is natural to assume that the schools play a Nash equilibrium, i.e. take
the other schools model as given. Each school will then set its own model
by maximizing its utility subject to the data matching constraints such as (8).
Note that the schools do not derive utility from their own model, what they
really care about is the average model, since it is the one used by the policy
maker when setting the level of public expenditures20 . Given school 2s model,
20Again, the "policy maker" is a metaphor for the decision process. There is no agent who
believes in model A since it does not explain the data, only the compromise between di¤erent
factions that have a say in policy leads to the same policy that a unitary government with
the same preferences and a belief in model A would choose.
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there exists a set of average models that are feasible for school 1. These are the
average perceived models A = (a^; !^; ^2u; ^
2
v; 
2
") such that there exists a model
for school 1 A1 = (a1; !1; 2u1; 
2
v1; 
2
") such that a^ = a

1a
1 
2 ; etc, and A1 2
IM(A). Figure 4 shows how to construct the locus of feasible average models
FM1 for school 1. Any such model must be on the contract curve between the
two schools, at a location corresponding to their respective weights, and at the
same time school 1 must lie on the locus of identied models in the corresponding
equilibrium. (Note that this also need to be true for school 2 in equilibrium, but
not necessarily for a deviation considered by school 1, a point to which we return
later). This feasibility locus represents the set of average beliefs that school 1
can elicit by appropriately choosing its own theory, given school 2s theory.
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
In principle, then, the economy could be at an equilibrium such as the one
depicted on Figure 5, where the feasibility loci intersect, and each scools indif-
ference curve is tangent to its own feasibility locus.
[FIGURE 5 HERE]
In fact, such an equilibrium is unlikely to arise. To see this, consider for
example what would happen if instead of two schools we had a continuum of
schools, each with an innitesimal inuence. Then in (8), the average perceived
model, captured by the parameters a^ and !^; changes only innitesimally as
a given schools model changes. Therefore, the parameters a^ and !^ are now
treated as xed by each school, meaning that they all face the same trade-
o¤ between a1 and !1; implying also that they face the same feasibility locus.
In other words, everything takes place as though the two curves on Figure
5 coincide. But, since di¤erent schools have di¤erent preferences, the same
aggregate perceived model cannot be optimal for them. If the feasibility loci
coincide, an equilibrium where all schools have their indi¤erence curve tangent
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to their feasibility locus at the average perceived model cannot arise. In a
similar fashion, getting back to the two schools case, we can consider what
happens if their preferences di¤er marginally from those of the government,
that is '1  '2  ': In such a situation, it is natural to assume that they
will choose models that also marginally di¤er from the truth. A rst-order
apprroximation of (8) around the correct model (i.e. around a^ = a and !^ = 1)
is
!1   1 = !1a(a  a1)
'+ a2
:
This formula tells us that at a rst-order approximation, the trade-o¤ be-
tween !i and ai does not depend on the average perceived model. This is because
the deviation between the average perceived model and the correct model only
has second order e¤ects. Since the correct model is the same for both schools
and independent of their perceived models, they again face the same trade-o¤
between !i and ai; as in the case with a continuum of schools. This again rules
out an interior equilibrium where the average perceived model is optimal for
both schools.
What do we, then, expect to observe? In equilibrium, each school will try to
choose a corner solution, that is a point on the common feasibility locus which
is as extreme as possible. For example school one will pick a theory with the
largest possible value of a1; while school 2 will pick a theory with the smallest
possible value of a2: In other words, intellectual competition between schools of
thought who try to inuence outcomes generates polarized views. The reason
is that they are trying to manipulate the same average perceived beliefs and
have di¤erent targets for those. This is very similar to a game where each player
announces a number between 0 and 100 and each derive utility from the average
of these two numbers. As long as the two players have di¤erent preferences about
that average, the Nash equilibrium is such that one player announces 0 and the
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other announces 100. This is true even though their preferences may be quite
close: we expect to observe polarized views among economists who may in the
end only marginally di¤er in their preferences.
Such polarized views are not unseen. During the early nineties, the contro-
versies between "fresh water" and "salt water" macroeconomists were polarized:
the former emphasized the role of supply shocks in business cycles considerably,
while the latter were very dismissive about such views21 . Similarly, the recent
multiplier controversy is arguably polarized, with prominent economists being
in favor of either "large" (i.e. 2) or "small" (i.e. 0.5) multipliers, with few views
in the middle22 .
Note however that here we reach the limits of the assumption that the in-
tellectuals are naively believed by their followers. Even if one does not have the
required knowledge to reverse engineer their statements, the mere observation of
polarized views indicates to the policymakers that they are being manipulated.
This surely puts limits on the degree of polarization that one should observe,
but to know more about that we would need to work with a more complex
model where the policymakers could detect manipulation despite not knowing
the correct model nor the expertspreferences, which would open the door for
an economist with a less extreme model to enter the market and steal followers
from the extremists. On the other hand, we may also explore the idea that
extreme views may survive because they are more parsimonious and because
they generate more clear-cut prescriptions for actions.
5.2 Mutation-proofness and consensus
A general theme of the approach I am discussing is that variation in policy
regimes generally change the equilibrium, which increases the amount of data
21An account of these controversies can be found in Blanchard (2009), who also notes their
tendency to erode over time and for consensus to emerge.
22See Batini et al. (2012). Intuitively, a crisis leads people to dismiss previous data; this
increases the degrees of freedom of the intellectuals, and therefore the scope for controversy.
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that any acceptable model has to explain: such a model now has to replicate the
relevant moments for each policy regime. Consequently, the set of autocoherent
models is reduced: changes in policy regimes act as a natural experiment which
increases the number of parameters that are identied. I will discuss these issues
to a greater extent in the next section, but they are also relevant to intellectual
competition.
When a school considers deviating and picking a di¤erent model, it faces the
constraint that its alternative model must explain the data, taking into account
that as a result of its deviation, the equilibrium will change due to changes in
average beliefs. But this change in equilibrium will then typically make the
models of other schools invalid, and our school can very well live with that23 .
This means that by deviating, any school, by changing average beliefs, can force
a "natural experiment" that would invalidate the other schoolsmodels. This
is somewhat problematic for our equilibrium concept, because then there is no
reason why, upon my deviating, my competitorsmodels should be continue to
be believed.
This suggests that it makes sense to consider "mutation-proof" strategies,
that is to impose that any theory explains the data regardless of the beliefs
promoted by competing theories. This is a strong restriction because it does
not restrict the competing theories to be mutation proof themselves; that is, it
allows for my competitors to hold demonstrably false views, assuming that they
are charismatic enough to nevertheless have followers. It would be interesting
to relax such a strong concept of mutation proofness, but here it is enough to
illustrate my point.
We can rewrite Equation (8) as
!1   1 = !1(a

1a
1 
2 )(a  a1)
(!1!
1 
2 )('+ (a

1a
1 
2 )
2)
:
23Note however that if it takes into account the consequences of a competing school being
abandoned as a result of its own deviation (such as more people adopting its own model), it
will pick a di¤erent model since the set of feasible average perceived models is changed.
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In a mutation-proof equilibrium, this has to hold for any competing model
(a2; !2); not just for the equilibrium one. Clearly, this can be the case only if
a = a1 and ! = !1: The correct model must now be reavealed.
More generally, though, it may be that mutation-proofness does not yield
enough constraints to force to reveal the correct model. In such cases it will
induce the economist to reveal some parameters (or perhaps a combination of
parameters), while at the same time the tendencies for polarization on other
parameters will remain. Thus we see how intellectual competition generates
forces towards polarization as well as consensus, although here consensus arises
over the correct model, because mutation proofness compels the schools to come
up with more robust theories, rather than out of a need to conform to the views
of others.
6 Degenerative research programs
In the preceding discussion, I implicitly assumed that the correct models spec-
ication was common knowledge, by imposing that any perceived model should
have the same structure as the correct one and di¤er from it only because it
has di¤erent parameter values. But of course in reality the correct specication
is unknown, so that a self-serving expert could pick his specication so as to
preserve or achieve inuence. Indeed, a measure of the degree of inuence is
I = A B   C; (9)
where A is the number of independent parameters of my model, B is the number
of autocoherence conditions, and C the number of policy parameters set by the
government. Generally, if I  0; the expert is a quasi-dictator. On the other
hand, if I   C; the expert is forced to reveal the correct model.
Let us go back to the remark, made in the preceding section, that policy
regime changes generate new observations that make it more di¢ cult for my
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model to match the data. This means that we expect B to increase each time
there is a regime change. Let us hold A and C xed. If regime changes happen
with a non zero probability, if there is an arbitrarily large number of potential
policy regimes, and if one does not forget the data, then at some point I will
fall to  C and the experts inuence will vanish.
However, if we now assume that the correct value of A is not know, there is
now a natural way for the expert to preserve his inuence, by making the model
more complex, i.e. by adding parameters, so that A could increase over time in
line with B: In a dynamic fashion, the experts model could be rejected after
a policy regime change (or any other natural experiment), and he would come
up with a more complicated model that would explain the new data in addition
to the old ones. One may wonder why anydoby would still believe him, rather
that say a competitor. However it does not really matter to us whether we are
talking about the initial expert or a competitor, as long as the competitor is
also self-interested and has to come up with an equally complex model in order
to explain the data.
Therefore we expect self-interested experts to make their model more com-
plex over time in order to preserve inuence. This is similar to the notion of a
degenerative research program discussed by Lakatos (1978), a follower of Kuhn
(1962). The distinction between progressive and degenerate research programs,
according to Lakatos, is summarized in Table 3.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
6.1 A simple example
Let us illustrate this point in the context of our simple framework. In our model,
part of the reason why the government does not know the correct Keynesian
multiplier is that according to its beliefs it is pursuing an optimal stabilization
policy, by which public expenditures are colinear with the signal z: Suppose we
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are in a situation such as the one described in section 3, with the perceived
model set by an interested expert, and that there is now an exogenous, random
source of variation in public expenditure, such aa a war, a natural disaster, and
so forth. Then the total amount of public expenditure is now equal to
g = x+ ;
where x is the discretionary spending component and  is the noise. Again
I assume that it is common knowledge that the variance-covariance matrix of
(u; v; "; ) is diagonal. The government now only controls x and cannot o¤set
the noise : It is clear that it is optimal for the government to set x at the same
level as it was setting g in the absence of noise, that is x = z; with  given by
(2). The novelty, though, is that g is no longer colinear with z: Any autocoherent
model must match the variance-covariance matrix of (y; z; g); which implies 6
restrictions, while the model only has ve parameters. Therefore, in this new
regime, the correct model typically has to be revealed. Indeed, reducing again
the analysis to a^ and !^; it can be checked that instead of one trade-o¤ between
these two perceived parameters, we now have two, which can be written as24 :


1  1
!^

=
 
2(1 + 2"

+ 2)(a^  a); (10)
1  1
!^
= (1 + 2")(a^  a): (11)
The rst trade-o¤ derives from the autocoherence condition E^yg = Eyg;
and the second one derives from E^yz = Eyz: It is straightforward to check that
for these two conditions to hold it must be that a^ = a and !^ = ! = 1: It can
also be shown that the other correct parameter values, including in particular
2, have to be revealed.
Thus it appears that it the new regime, the economist is compelled to reveal
the truth. Indeed, if prior to the regime he was promoting an incorrect model,
the model would have to be abandoned in favor of the correct one. Given that
24 In (10) we make use of the restriction that ^2 = 
2
 ; which is why 
2
 instead of ^
2
 appears
on the RHS.
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in any case the preceding model has to be abandoned, though, the economist
may consider other options than revealing the correct model that may preserve
his inuence. In particular, as long as the correct specication is not common
knowledge (and there is no reason why it should be since a specication funda-
mentally is an intellectual construct), the economist can preserve his inuence
by making the model more complex, that is, by increasing the number of para-
meters A so as to o¤set the increase in the number of autocoherence conditions
B:
Suppose then that upon invalidation of the preceding perceived model in
the new regime, the economist now modies it marginally and claims that the
random component of public expenditures has a di¤erent multiplier from the
systematic one. That is indeed plausible, since under rational expectations
surprises generally have di¤erent e¤ects from anticipated shocks. That is, output
determination is now
y = ax+ b + u+ v;
where the correct parameter values are such that b = a but the economist can
pick b^ di¤erent from a^: It is then easy to see that the autocoherence condition
(10) becomes


1  1
!^

=
 
2(1 + 2"

+ 2)(a^  a) + ^2(b^  a); (12)
while the other autocoherence condition (11), i.e. Eyz = E^yz; is unchanged, as
it does not involve b^ since it is common knowledge that the shocks (u; v; "; ) are
uncorrelated. Furthermore it must still be that ^2 = 
2
; which comes from the
fact that x is observed and the variance of g has to be matched. Therefore (12)
denes a trade-o¤ between the three perceived parameters a^; b^; and !^: Given a
choice for a^ and !^ that matches (11), the economist can now freely pick b^ to
match (12). Therefore, the economist can preserve his inuence by using the
new, less parsimonious model and act again as a quasi-dictator.
In fact, it turns out that the economists cannot lie about b: Substituting
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(11) into (12) imples that b^ = a: This is not surprising as  = g   x = g   z is
observed and a simple regression of y on  allows to observe b: But by sticking to
a specication such that b 6= a; the economist can still pick a^ 6= a so as to get his
most preferred outcome. In fact, he will report the same keynesian multiplier
as prior to the regime change. This is because
(i) the autocoherence condition E^z2 = Ez2 is unchanged in the new spec-
ication and together with (11) which is also unchangedit implies the same
trade-o¤ between !^ and a^ as in (3).
(ii) Since (2) still holds, so does (4) which is just a special case of (2).
Therefore the economist, when picking a^ and !^ so as to equate  with E ; will
choose the same values as before, and policy will not change. Furthermore, since
the economist correctly reports that b^ = a; the new perceived model correctly
imputes the component of the output variance due to ; and because of that
the autocoherence condition Ey2 = E^y2 is also unchanged. As a result, ^2v will
also be the same as before.
6.2 The importance of framing
One may observe that the new perceived model that preserves the economists
inuence is less parsimonious that the correct one. Thus if the policymaker
were to choose between the two (say if a competitor proposed the correct model,
which matches the data as well as any perceived one in any equilibrium) and
the policymaker were to apply Occams razor, he would pick the correct model.
This argument is not very compelling, for two reasons.
First, in general parsimony is not evidence of being correct. Models are
supposed to be simplications of reality, and the simpler the model, the more
remote it is from reality. It is true in our example that the more complicated
model has no more explanatory power than the simpler one, but since they lead
to di¤erent policies, the government may reasonably believe that the more so-
phisticated model indicates a better understanding of reality by the economist
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who proposes it. Furthermore, parsimony may be a way to frame the presenta-
tion of an incorrect perceived model so as to make it more credible. For example,
suppose there are two parameters, p and q and that only p+ q is observed, with
p + q = 1: Suppose a biased economist wants the government to believe that
p = 0:95 and q = 0:05: In general the economist will have to produce a study
showing that these are the correct values, on the basis of some debatable iden-
tifying assumption that would deliver those values instead of say p = 0:6 and
q = 0:4: Arguably the best way to sweep the issue under the carpet would be to
adopt a parsimonious specication where one would estimate p to be equal to
one while ignoring q: This delivers a model which is close to the one preferred
by the economist, although not exactly equal to it. By ignoring q the economist
is implictly making the identifying assumption that q = 0 while conveniently
not calling attention upon the fact that he is making that assumption. This is
more credible than explicitly assuming q = 0:05 and defending it (an alterna-
tive technique is to relegate such identiying assumptions to some cumbersome
appendix at the end of the paper).
Second, and most importantly, if one denes parsimony dynamically in terms
of the amount of change that is required, it is not clear that the correct model
beats the new perceived one. As we have seen, in the new perceived model,
two new paramaters are introduced, b^ and ^2; and the perceived values of all
the other parameters are unchanged. On the other hand, if one were to adopt
the correct model one would have to change ones views on all the parameters
(a; !; 2u; 
2
v): Once the perceived model is rmly established as a frame of refer-
ence, making it more sophisticated at the margin will be more appealing than a
paradigm shift. The present discussion shows that such an incremental change
is appealing to the intellectual who wants to preserve his inuence. But other
factors, such as sheer career incentives and cognitive limitations such as di¢ -
culties to think "outside the box", will push in the same direction. As a result,
of course, the discipline will engage in a degenerative research programme.
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What is key here is that a frame of reference is a set of identifying assump-
tions. Thus, in the preceding example, the amendment to the existing model
 the "discovery" that random shifts in public expenditures have a di¤erent
multiplier  could rationally be presented as a new nding, as long as it is
considered, explicitly or implicitly, that it is "known" that the multiplier for
systematic expenditure shifts is equal to a^25 : Arnold Kling (2011) expresses his
sceptical views about such a process:
Because of the need to impose strong priors, the structural ap-
proach is nothing but a roundabout way of communicating the way
you believe the economy works. The estimated equations are not be-
ing used to discover relationships. Instead, the equations are being
used by the econometrician to communicate to others the econome-
tricians beliefs about how the economy ought to work. To a rst
approximation, using structural estimates is no di¤erent from creat-
ing a simulation model out of thin air by making up the parameters.
Kling (2011).
Kling also describes three main strategies that were used to preserve the
dominant paradigm in the face of new contradictory evidence (such as the drift
in the Phillips curve): "dropping old data; add factors; and lagged dependent
variables.". Clearly the last two practices can be interpreted in light of Lakatoss
views regarging degenerative research programme. A similar account of macro-
econometric practice can be found in Lucas and Sargent (1979).:
"The track record of the major econometric models is (...) very
poor.(...). Moreover, this di¢ culty is implicitly acknowledged by
model builders thelmselves, who routinely employ an elaborate sys-
25 In a similar vein, Lucas and Sargent (1979) describe how the postulates from the Gen-
eral Theory, such as those regarding the demand for money or the consumption function,
were systematically used as (unwarranted, in their view) identifying assumptions in structural
macroeconometric modelling.
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tem of add factors in forecasting, in an attempt to o¤set the contin-
uing drift of the model away from the actual series."
Lucas and Sargent (1979)
Note that there are other mechanisms for preserving an existing paradigm.
For example Cogley and Sargent (2005) argue that the old Phillips curve hy-
pothesis was only discarded by policymakers in favor of the natural rate one in
the late 1970s, despite that its likelihood was (in their view) quite low as early
as 1970. Their idea, borrowed from Hansen and Sargents (2005) robust control
theory, is that the old Phillips curve view delivered the worst case scenario of
a painful disination; under robust control, a lot of weght is given to the worst
case scenario even though the model that delivers it is unlikely26 . From our
perspective, this suggests that the expert can strategically use the policymaker
tendencies toward prudence, by devising a model such that policy deviations
from the experts preferred outcome are very costly, i.e. acting as a doomsayer.
Indeed, revising ones model to make it more dramatic may be viewed as one
instance of a degenerative research programme.
7 Conclusion
A scientic paradigm is necessary to set a framework for scientic progress. Sim-
ilarly, an economic paradigm is necessary for policy to be conducted. But are
economic paradigms neutral or do they reect an agenda? Here I have explored
the latter possibility, on the basis of two stark simplifying assumptions. The
rst assumption is that the policymaker naively accepts the model presented to
him by the economists. The second assumption is that the economist knows the
correct model and cynically reports an incorrect (but unfalsiable) one. The
analysis hopefully delivers some interesting insights about how interest groups
may a¤ect beliefs even in the case where those are embodied in sophisticated
26This view is consistent with the historical account of De Long (1996).
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theories validated by the data. But it leaves many questions open to future
research. One will need to relax these two assumptions in order to better un-
derstand how people pick the theories they use and how political preferences
shape the views of the intellectuals in a sophisticated fashion. Also, we need to
understand why some theories (such as the Keynesian one), rather than com-
peting ones, become the dominant paradigm, and why and when a paradigm is
eventually abandoned.
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Pro  State Contra State 
Slack Equilibrium 
Adaptive 
Expectations 
Rational 
expectations 
Demand  shocks Supply  shocks 
High Keynesian 
Multiplier 
Low Keynesian 
Multiplier 
 
Table 1 – Macroeconomic views and preferences for state intervention 
Pro  Contra 
Monopsony Competition 
Low labour 
demand 
elasticity 
High labour 
demand elasticity 
Table 2  -- Views on the labor market and preferences for high minimum wages 
Progressive  • New facts are predicted by the 
theory 
• These facts are subsequently 
confirmed empirically 
Degenerative • New facts invalidate the existing 
theory 
• Theory made more complex to 
accommodate the new facts 
Table 3 – Progressive vs. Degenerative research programs according to Lakatos (1978) 
â 
CM 
2 
1 
3 
AM 
IM(1) 
EE(1) 
IM(2) 
Figure 1 – Autocoherent models 
â 
CM 
AM 
Figure 2 – Determination of the perceived model 
Perceived model 
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Indifference  curve 
â 
CM 
2 
1 
IM(A) 
Figure 3 – Two schools of thought 
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Figure 4 – The feasible average models locus 
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Figure 5 --  Interior equilibrium 
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